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Connecting Trade and International Labor
Standards: Denial of Worker Rights as an
Unfair Trade Practice
Kevin Hickey*
Huddled over a primitive loom in a dimly lit carpet factory in
Morocco, an eleven year old boy works for endless hours tying
small knots over and over again as he slowly goes blind.1 On the
other side of the world in South Korea, labor organizers are tor-
tured by Government security forces with beatings and electric
shock.2 Meanwhile, in the Philippines, young women are recruited
to do monotonous factory work, and then receive periodic preg-
nancy tests in order to avoid maternity benefits.3 Glass-factory
employees in India work among glass splinters and molten glass
without safety glasses or even shoes, many bearing scars or open
wounds as vivid reminders of the dangerously unsafe working
conditions.4
As is evident above, abusive labor practices come in many
forms. But whether it be exploitation of child labor, dangerous
work conditions, lack of a livable wage, or denial of any other basic
* Kevin Hickey will receive his J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law
School in May, 1989. The author thanks Paul Maas, J.D. 1988, University of Minne-
sota, for providing the initial idea on which this article is based.
1. Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, Child Labor: The Profits of Shame,
Washington Post, July 12, 1987, at C1, col. 1. This article describes shocking exam-
ples of exploitative child-labor practices in several countries, many of which are sig-
nificant United States trading partners. The article is reproduced and briefly
discussed in connection with the trade bill amendment discussed later. See 133
Cong. Rec. S10332 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
The literature is full of other appalling examples of the mistreatment of work-
ers. See e.g., Charles D. Gray, Business Forum: Do We Subsidize Exploitation of
the Workers?, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1987, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (describing the death of 19
workers in a Bangkok factory fire).
2. Julie Brill, Press South Korea On Labor Abuses, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987,
at A21, col. 1.
3. Hobart Rowen, The Exploitation of Filipino Workers, Washington Post,
Mar. 6, 1986, at A23, col. 3.
In Southeast Asia, women are particularly subject to mistreatment by their
employers. N.Y. Times, supra note 1; Systematic Labor Repression is an Unfair
Trade Practice, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 21, 1987, at 16 (describing the prac-
tice where 10-14-year-old Southeast Asian girls are "sold" into factory work by
their impoverished parents for $20-$100).
4. Albright & Kunstel, supra note 1.
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right, the systematic repression of fundamental worker rights is a
problem of global proportions. Such horrendous practices, how-
ever, are often dismissed as necessary consequences of the ever ex-
panding global economy,5 or as problems over which the United
States has no control. Such assumptions cannot be further from
the truth. In various ways the United States plays a substantial
role in perpetuating this situation. Massive United States corpora-
tions in search of the cheapest possible costs have invested billions
in less developed countries (LDCs),6 many of which have dismal
records on worker rights. Furthermore, United States trade poli-
cies do little to alter these substandard labor practices by granting
most favored nation status and other trade benefits to the worst
offenders.7
Workers in LDCs are not the only group affected by United
States trade policies and the behavior of transnational corporations
(TNCs).8 Hundreds of thousands of jobs are "exported" from
United States workers to other countries.9 The United States sim-
5. It is frequently asserted that various Third World countries must provide
"cheap labor" in order to survive. But such horrendous labor practices are not a
"necessity" in the world economy. While inexpensive and abundant labor forces
are an integral part of the complex global economy, it does not follow that the
workers which make up this labor force must be denied the most minimal safe-
guards. Many countries, including the U.S., have overcome previously substandard
labor practices and prospered. Furthermore, less developed countries such as Jor-
dan engage in fair labor practices, while in Morocco, with a similar economic pro-
file, labor abuses run rampant. 133 Cong. Rec. S10332 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
6. Don J. Pease & J. William Goold, The New GSP: Fair Trade With the Third
World, 4 World Pol'y J. 351, 358 (1985). In 1982, U.S. corporations invested $221
billion. Id. at 358. As of 1984, well over 2,000 U.S. firms operated more than 21,000
foreign subsidiaries in at least 121 foreign nations. 1 Directory of American Firms
Operating in Foreign Countries (10th ed. 1984).
7. Chile, for example, until recently has been granted trade benefits which ig-
nited $250 million worth of investments by U.S. corporations despite barbaric treat-
ment of labor. Lance Compa, Eliminate Trade Benefits for Chile, Oakland
Tribune, Dec. 15, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
8. In the literature, the term Transnational Corporation (TNC) is used inter-
changeably with Multinational Enterprise (MNE), although there are slight distinc-
tions. TNC will be used in this article since the United Nations has adopted the
term. See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the Sixth Session,
66 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 10), at 14, U.N. Doc. E/C 10/75 (1980). Furthermore,
this term reflects the article's focus on business enterprises. However, when quot-
ing or referring to other authorities the terminology used will be that employed by
the authority.
There are several definitions of TNC. Generally, a TNC is a "number of affili-
ated business establishments which function simultaneously in different countries,
are joined together by ties of common ownership of control, and are responsible to
a common management strategy." William Feld, Nongovernmental Forces and
World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups 22-23 (1972).
9. See, e.g., D. Quinn Mills, Destructive Trade-offs in U.S. Trade Policy, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 119.
It is estimated that a joint venture between General Motors and a Korean
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ply cannot compete with LDCs such as Taiwan and South Korea
where, through repression of the labor force, the wages are forced
to be a fraction of what they are here.10 The result is massive for-
eign investment by TNCs in countries where even minimal worker
rights are ignored."
While the effect of trade policies on the availability of domes-
tic jobs has long been recognized, until recently the connection be-
tween United States trade policies and the rights of international
workers has been minimized or completely overlooked. 12 Yet few
actions could have a more profound effect on basic human rights
among the citizens of LDCs than trade policies of the world's pre-
mier economic power encouraging the implementation of certain
minimal labor standards.13 Direct aid to developing countries
aimed at improving living conditions, while praiseworthy, often
proves fruitless. Approximately two billion dollars a year has been
automaker, where labor conditions are substandard, resulted in a loss of 20,000 jobs
to U.S. workers. Remarks of United Auto Workers President Owen Bieber before
the Conference on Labor Rights and Trade, Mar. 6, 1986 (on file with Law &
Inequality).
10. D.L.U. Jayawardena, Free Trade Zones, 17 J. World Trade Law 427, 431
(1983).
11. This in turn has resulted in the U.S. being swallowed by a gigantic trade
deficit. The trade balance, which showed a surplus for the U.S. as recently as 1981,
has plummeted to $170 billion as more and more TNCs shift their production over-
seas. Put another way, the deficit amounts to over $600 for each American. Bill
Goold and John Cavanagh, A Trade Policy for the People, The Nation, Mar. 29,
1986, at 452.
Recent figures indicate that there are a few signs of relief from these deficits.
In October, 1987, the trade deficit jumped to a record $17.6 billion for the month. 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1552 (Dec. 16, 1987). By May, 1988, however, the
deficit had decreased significantly, although it remains disturbingly high. David
Wessel, New Trade Data Show Deficit Shrinking, Wall St. J., June 10, 1988, at 2,
col. 2.
12. While there have been several half-hearted attempts to join trade policy
with worker rights, their effect has been minimal. See infra notes 39-62 and ac-
companying text.
13. Worker rights have long been categorized as a human right, although they
have been frequently overlooked. William B. Gould, The Rights of Wage Earners:
Of Human Rights and International Labor Standards, 3 Indus. Rel. & Int'l Bus.
489 (1979). For a collection of works which discuss worker rights or the right to
development as a human right, see International Commission of Jurists, Develop-
ment, Human Rights and the Rule of Law (1981).
It has frequently been asserted that U.S. foreign policy, including trade policy,
can effectively carry out human rights objectives. See generally David Weissbrodt,
Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 Geo. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 231
(1977); Oscar Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Pol-
icies, 24 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 73 (1978).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 23: "Every one
who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration insuring for himself
and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if neces-
sary, by other means of social protection." Gould, supra, at 497 (quoting Human
Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments (United Nations 1978)).
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channeled into "development assistance programs" in recent
years.14 The impact of such programs when compared to the 221
billion dollars invested abroad by United States TNCs and the 402
billion dollars in lending by United States commercial banks is
minimal.15 The true power for change lies not with direct aid, but
with the huge amounts of capital and resources being invested by
United States TNCs. If these billions can be directed toward coun-
tries that afford basic rights to their workers rather than those
countries which exploit and abuse their workers, true progress can
be made.
At a time when Congress is considering major reforms in
United States trade law,16 the possibilities of basing trade benefits
on the fulfillment of certain internationally recognized labor stan-
dards must be examined. 17 This article will discuss first the back-
ground of the denial of basic worker rights, focusing on the role
that two major forces-United States TNCs and United States
trade policy-play in perpetuating the problem. This will be fol-
lowed by an analysis of the feasibility of connecting trade with la-
bor standards, including the specific proposal being considered by
Congress. The goal of this proposal is to prevent countries from
exploiting their work force in order to gain trade advantages, by
defining such conduct as an unfair trade practice under existing
United States trade laws.
This article advocates the adoption of a "worker rights" pro-
vision to designate the denial of internationally recognized worker
rights as an unfair trade practice under section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974.18 Although the bill, the Fair Trade and Economic Jus-
tice Act, may have other effects relating to employment for United
States workers, the trade deficit and other United States economic
14. Pease and Goold, supra note 6, at 358.
15. Id. at 358. The power of trade as a tool for promoting policy concerns is po-
tentially staggering considering that $150 billion in trade moves across national bor-
ders every day. John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, International Economic
Relations 3 (2d ed. 1986).
16. See 133 Cong. Red. S10249-10373 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
17. Both houses of the Congress have been struggling and debating over the
passage of an omnibus trade bill throughout the entire session of the 100th Con-
gress. H.R. 3, the house version of the bill, was introduced on January 6, 1987, and
the Senate's version, S. 490, on February 5, 1987. 133 Cong. Rec. H101 (1987); 133
Cong. Rec. S1851 (1987). The bill was amended numerous times and finally passed
in both houses, but was vetoed by President Reagan. The Senate by a vote of 61-37
barely failed to override the veto. At the time this article went to press, the status
of the bill was still uncertain. Monica Langley, Senate Falls Short of Overriding
Veto of Trade Measure, Wall St. J., June 16, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2401 (1975).
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woes, the focus of this article is the bill's possibilities with respect
to the basic rights of workers all over the world.
I. The Problem: The Role That Two Major Forces Play
The denial of internationally recognized basic worker rights
stems, in part, from the unfortunate marriage between United
States TNCs and United States government trade policies. TNCs
in recent years have sprawled to dozens of LDCs in search of vast
amounts of cheap labor.1 9 This rapid expansion is not expected to
cease in the near future.20 Meanwhile, the government's trade
policy has thrown fuel on the fire.21 Trade policies that effectively
reward labor exploitation compound the problems created by
TNCs, harming the millions of laborers in poverty stricken or re-
pressive countries.
A. The Transnational Corporation
Only recently has there been an awareness among the Ameri-
can people of the conduct of TNCs in foreign countries.22 In the
name of maximizing profits many TNCs will do business in any
country where cheap labor can be found, regardless of the labor
practices of that country.23 The argument usually made on behalf
19. As of 1984, over 2,000 U.S. firms operated more than 21,000 foreign subsidi-
aries in at least 121 foreign nations. Introduction to 1 Directory of American Firms
Operating in Foreign Countries (10th ed. 1984). According to Peter Hansen, director
of the Committee on TNCs, U.S. firms have increased their share of foreign invest-
ments from 10% to 60% over the last decade. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1987, § D, at 19,
col. 3.
20. N.Y. Times, supra note 19.
21. South Korea, the second largest beneficiary of the Guaranteed System of
Preferences program (see infra text accompanying notes 43-52) has blatantly re-
stricted the rights of labor through martial law decrees and other measures. Osten-
sibly, South Korea allows its labor to organize for increased benefits, but in reality
such requirements as 30 workers per work site in order to organize, effectively
stamps out unions where 80% of all workers are employed in businesses of less
than 30 people. Pease and Goold, supra note 6, at 359.
22. Unfortunately, it takes a tragedy like the Bhopal, India, incident to draw at-
tention to the behavior of U.S. corporations in LDCs. The deaths of an estimated
2,500 people from lethal gas escaping from a Union Carbide plant prompted new
calls for a code of conduct to guide TNCs. Associated Press, June 17, 1985. At the
outset of the discussion of the role that TNCs play in perpetuating the denial or
worker rights, it should be noted that some TNCs are taking steps to foster im-
proved conditions in many of the countries where they are located. See generally,
Leonard Glym, Multinationals in the World of Nations (1983); Norbert Horn, In-
ternational Rules for Multinational Enterprises: The ICC, OECD, and ILO Initia-
tives, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 923, 928 (1981). These improvements, however, are not
sufficient given the magnitude of the problem.
23. A senior vice-president in charge of Citibank's international division was
quoted as saying: "Who knows what political system works? The only test we care
about is: Can they pay their bills?" In response to this quote Melville J. Ulmer,
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of TNCs is that most of these countries are much better off with
the business of TNCs than they otherwise would be.24 The validity
of this argument has been seriously questioned in a number of
studies.2s Certainly foreign investment into LDCs has some
favorable effects, but for the laborer these effects remain illusory
for several reasons.
First, the earnings that are generated from the sweat of the
workers are typically removed from the LDCs' struggling econo-
mies by the TNCs. This capital is rarely reinvested into the host
country's economy where it is needed for development, but rather
is quickly removed to the United States.26 Therefore, the fruits of
the worker's labor are never realized in the form of real develop-
Professor Emeritus at the University of Maryland, said: "As representatives of their
stockholders, business executives in fact have only one legitimate obligation: to
take whatever prudent actions are necessary to maximize profits within the limits
set by the nations's [sic] laws." 41 Bus. & Soc'y Rev. 4, 5 (1982). The message is
clear: anything goes with respect to doing business in foreign countries, no matter
how repressive the regime, as long as profits are made. Furthermore, these quotes
underscore the need for controls on the behavior of TNCs in LDCs.
24. Some have articulated this argument in flowery terms, which ignore reality
to such an extent to be almost comical:
As it was in the industrial west, the process of development will be
wrenching, painful, sometimes halting. But the sheer productive ca-
pacity unleashed by the MNC [Multinational Corporation] is bringing
with it the means of eradicating hunger, poverty, and disease. Harnes-
sing that engine of wealth to realize those human dreams remains a
vital, unfinished task of our time.
Glynn, supra note 22, at 32.
25. See generally, Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach (1974);
Arghiri Emmanuel, Appropriate or Underdeveloped Technology (1982); Adeoye A.
Akin Sanya, Multinationals in Changing Environment 2 (1984).
The following episode is a prime example that countries are not always "better
off" when it comes to the presence of TNCs:
Mattel Corporation decides it no longer wishes to manufacture dolls in
the U.S. as it can get cheaper labor overseas as well as government
guarantees of a docile labor force. It moves its plant across the border
to Mexico where wages are a fifth of U.S. levels. Workers in the plant,
however, form a union and fight to achieve basic worker rights. Mat-
tel decides to move to Korea. The same action occurs in Korea. Mattel
picks up the factory and moves to the Philippines. Here, the Philip-
pine government promises even cheaper labor, a tax holiday of eight
years, a prohibition on strikes and union activity, and the ability to
lock workers into the factory for forced overtime when needed ....
The latest chapter occurred last year when the tax holiday ran out in
the Philippines. The government of Thailand offered even cheaper
wages and its own form of tax holiday. Mattel accepted.
Trade Reform Legislation, 1986: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 956 (1986) (statement of
John Cavanagh, Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies; Coordinator, International La-
bor Rights Working Group).
26. A United Nations study showed that U.S.-based TNCs took an average of




ment, but instead are returned to the United States to line the
pockets of corporation shareholders.27 Second, TNCs frequently
use scarce local resources of capital, thus severely limiting those
available for local operations.28 For example, when given the
choice a local bank will loan to a worldwide corporation such as
General Motors rather than a local entrepreneur who wants to
start a manufacturing company. The effect is to stagnate the de-
velopment of domestic industries. A third reason why the "bene-
fits" of TNC operations are illusory is that only a small minority of
the country's people see any of the profits that are amassed. A
World Bank study revealed that during the explosion of invest-
ment into LDCs that occurred in the 1960s, the income of the rich-
est five percent showed a "striking" increase while the poorest
forty percent saw their share decrease. The above facts demon-
strate that the benefits of the TNCs' investments are not being dis-
tributed among the large work force, currently existing on
subsistent wages and inhuman conditions. If these workers were
to receive their equitable share of the capital being pumped into
their countries, then the true development of LDCs might become
a reality.
The exploitation of the labor conditions in developing coun-
tries is further compounded by the inability of those countries to
regulate TNCs. One consideration is simply the immense eco-
nomic power of large TNCs. The economic activitiy of massive
TNCs is on the scale of most medium size countries. For example,
General Motors' earnings in a single year are roughly equivalent to
the Swiss national budget.3 0 Given this vast economic power,
TNCs have a tremendous impact on the economies of LDCs. A de-
cision by a corporate manager could seriously affect an unstable
and overly-dependent LDC.31 Another factor often present is the
fierce competition among the countries themselves for foreign in-
27. As one commentator put it: "[C]ompany accountants do everything possible
to launder money out of [that country's] sights." F.E.I. Hamilton, The Multination-
als: Spearhead or Spectre?, in Multinational Corporations and the Third World 15
(C.J. Dixon ed. 1986).
28. Barnet & Muller, supra note 25, at 152.
29. Id at 149.
30. Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and Repressive Regimes:
The Ethical Dilemma, 15 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 542 (1985).
31. Id. at 545. For example, Barnet and Muller observe that a decision by a cor-
porate manager can impact "where people live; what work, if any, they will do;
what they will eat, drink and wear; what sorts of knowledge schools and universi-
ties will encourage; and what kind of society their children will inherit." Supra
note 25, at 16.
1988]
Law and Inequality
vestment.32 The TNC will not typically do business in a country
which it perceives as over regulating business practices. There-
fore, the capital-poor LDCs are forced to provide little or no regu-
lation if they want to receive any of the TNCs' business.
Additionally, technical and legal development essential for effec-
tive regulation is lacking. The fact is, LDCs simply do not have
the ability to regulate TNCs effectively. The net result is that
TNCs, drawn by loose regulations, flock toward the LDCs, taking
advantage of their labor conditions and their inability to exert any
significant control over the companies while leaving behind few
real benefits for the workers. This inability to regulate, when cou-
pled with the serious questions being raised regarding the conduct
of TNCs, 33 has produced calls for a set of guidelines to govern the
actions of TNCs. Such guidelines, or "codes of conduct," suggest
standards of behavior for TNCs to follow in foreign countries.34
Several international organizations, most notably the United Na-
tions (UN), have attempted to develop codes of conduct. 35 The UN
would seem the logical source for a code of conduct given its role
32. One commentator has termed this competition as "cut-throat" among vari-
ous developing countries. Hamilton, supra note 27, at 16.
33. For two disturbing examinations of the behavior of TNCs and their officers,
see generally Barnet & Muller, supra note 25, and Michael Macoby, The Games-
man 122 (1977). Macoby's study indicates that a corporate executive "will pollute
the environment, even when he privately supports environmentalists, unless the
law is such that each corporation must clean up its mess and none is being penal-
ized for being cleaner than the others. He will produce and advertise anything he
can sell unless food and drug laws or other legislation stops him." Macoby, supra,
at 122.
Interesting analogies of the profit motive have been used: "It is in my opinion,
as absurd to praise the profit motive-i.e., economic action based on self-interest-
as it is to condemn it. The human impulse to such action is like the sexual impulse,
a natural fact." Irving Kristol, No Cheers for Profit Motive, Wall St. J., Feb. 20,
1979, at 18, col. 4.
34. See generally, Seymour Rubin, Transnational Corporations: Supervision,
Regulation or What? 1 Int'l Trade L.J. 1 (1975); Werner Feld, Multinational Cor-
poration and U.N. Politics: The Quest for Codes of Conduct (1980); Seymour
Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct A Study of
the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Develop-
ment, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 903 (1981); Note, Host State Treatment of Transnational Cor-
porations: Formulation of a Standard for the United Nations Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, 7 Fordham Int'l L.J. 467 (1983).
Recently, a joint delegation of U.S. and Japanese union officials called for a
code of conduct specifically dealing with workers' rights. The leaders expressed
concern that TNCs "entertain no national loyalty or commitment, they exploit any
and all workers in the name of greed and profit. Their record shows that they will
drop any country and the workers involved if they find that they can make a
greater profit elsewhere." 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1345 (Nov. 4, 1987).
35. Two notable codes require attention. The International Labor Organiza-
tion's 'Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy" was adopted by the ILO on November 16, 1977, at its Zoym Ses-
sion in Geneva. See 17 Int'l L. Materials 423-30 (1978). The Organization for Eco-
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in international affairs and general acceptance worldwide. The
UN's code of conduct, however, has been in the works for several
years and many fundamental issues have yet to be resolved.36
Although a step in the right direction, codes of conduct are
simply not enough to solve the problems of TNCs exploiting
worker rights in LDCs for several reasons. Most importantly, the
codes are merely voluntary with no legally binding effect. TNCs
policing themselves may be a classic case of the fox watching over
the chicken coop. In fact, the issue of the voluntariness of the code
has been a major stumbling block of the UN code.37 Given the
shortcomings of the various codes of conduct, they cannot be the
vehicle through which fundamental worker rights are protected.3 8
B. United States Trade Policy
The second factor which has played a key role in denying in-
ternational worker rights is reflected in the trade policies of the
United States government. These trade policies perpetuate the
problem by encouraging trade with countries' that ruthlessly ex-
ploit their workers. Through a system of reduced tariffs, duty-free
status and other trade benefits to countries which repress and
abuse the labor force, United States trade policy makes it desirable
for TNCs to do business with these countries.3 9 Moreover, current
United States trade laws demonstrate a double standard with re-
spect to unfair trade practices involving labor.40
Historically, the United States government ignored the rela-
tionship between trade policy and worker rights. Then in 1971,
when the United States experienced its first trade deficit in sev-
enty-five years, an increasing sensitivity to unfair trade practices
emerged.41 In the last decade, as the United States continues to
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also promulgated a code. See
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1986).
36. See Kwamena Acquaah, International Regulation of Transnational Corpora-
tions: The New Reality 115-18 (1986).
37. Id. at 115. Other problems with the UN Code include the issues of un-
resolved objectives for the code and the proper definition of TNC. For example,
would a corporation with one employee abroad be subject to the code? Id. at 115-18.
38. For the multitude of problems inherent in codes of conduct, see generally,
Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (Norbert Horn
ed. 1980).
39. Korea and Taiwan, for example, are among the very largest beneficiaries of
duty-free treatment. Richard Lawrence, Labor Standards Proposed for GATT, The
J. of Com., Mar. 13, 1986, at 1. Yet, the reprehensible labor abuses that take place
in these countries are well documented. See generally, U.S. State Department
County Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986.
40. See infra discussion accompanying notes 53-55.
41. Susan C. Schwab, Politics, Economics and U.S. Trade Policy, 23 Stan. J. of
Int'l L. 155, 162-65 (1987).
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drown in an ever-deepening trade deficit, calls for treating the de-
nial of internationally-recognized worker rights as unfair trade
practices are becoming louder and more persistent.42
A primary factor in United States trade policy which encour-
ages TNCs to do business with labor exploitive LDCs is the Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSP). This program was
conceptualized in 1964 at the United Nations Conference of Trade
and Development (UNCTAD).43 Initially, GSP was envisioned as
a temporary system which would allow LDCs to become more
competitive by granting them preferential trade treatment.44 The
underlying theory is that the program will increase the countries'
ability to export, thus fostering economic development. In 1976,
the United States entered the program and has since designated al-
most 150 countries and territories as recipients of duty-free export-
ing privileges. Since 1976 the amount of import receiving GSP
treatment has risen dramatically.45
There is general agreement that the GSP system is essen-
tially a good program which is vital to the economic survival of
LDCs.46 In fact, the 98th Congress extended GSP through 1993. 4 7
Through most of its history, however, GSP did not address the la-
bor practices of the countries which received trade benefits. The
Trade Bill of 1984 amended GSP to withhold benefits from those
countries which violate their workers' rights,48 but this has turned
out to do little more than pay lip service to the problem. There
are essentially two reasons for this. First, under section 505 of the
GSP Renewal Act the President is given free reign to terminate
GSP status as he so chooses.49 The result has been that a GSP na-
tion rarely has lost preferential trade status based on its violation
of worker rights,50 despite open refusal by most all GSP nations to
42. See N.Y. Times, supra note 1; National Journal, Apr. 5, 1986, at 818; Oak-
land Tribune, supra note 7; Worker Rights: A Moral Basis for Trade Policy, Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Dec. 29, 1986, at 12, col. 1.
43. Diana Tussie, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System
30 (1987).
44. Pease and Goold, supra note 6, at 352. For more information on GSP, see
Jackson & Davey, supra note 15, at 1154-66; Ronald I. Meltzer, The U.S. Renewal of
the GSP: Implications for North-South Trade, 20 J. World Trade L. 507 (1986).
45. Pease & Goold, supra note 6, at 353.
46. Dag Wilkinson, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Its Impact on Developing
Countries, 20 Tex. Int'l L. J. 453, 468 (1985).
47. P.L. 98-573 (1984).
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2465 (1985).
49. P.L. 98-573 (1984); 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1984). The ineffectiveness of a system
where the President is given wide discretion is compounded by the fact that Presi-
dent Reagan strongly opposed the bill. U.S. Will Suspend Chile's Duty-Free Trade
Privilege, L.A. Times, Dec. 25, 1987, § 1, at 18, col. 3.
50. Linking Trade to Workers' Rights, National Journal, Apr. 5, 1986, at 818.
[Vol. 6:127
1988] CONNECTING TRADE
respect the "internationally recognized worker rights" as described
in the GSP Renewal Act.51 Second, the GSP program covers only
five percent of all the imports coming into the United States, mini-
mizing the impact it can have on worker rights.52 Therefore, as it
currently stands, the GSP does little to reduce the labor abuse
which it has played a role in fostering.
An additional problem with United States trade policy is the
way that current law approaches unfair trade practices. Under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1979, certain practices, such as fail-
ure to recognize intellectual property rights, are prohibited. 53 The
denial of fundamental worker rights, however, is not considered to
be unfair under section 301. The purpose of section 301 is to retali-
ate against trade practices which unfairly distort trade.54 This sec-
tion is the primary vehicle through which citizens harmed by
unfair trade practices may challenge such conduct.55 It is difficult
to imagine a trade practice which distorts trade and undercuts
competition in a more unfair way than the denial of basic worker
rights, yet current trade law permits this conduct. In short, the ab-
sence of section 301 protection for denial of worker rights, while
allowing such protection for other trade practices, sends a clear
message to our trading partners: abuse of labor in order to gain
competitive advantage is fair game under United States trade law.
There are two positive aspects of United States trade law in
this area. One is the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which
eliminates tariffs on most products from the Caribbean region.5 6
This act calls for the President to "take into account," as one of
For the first time, a few countries lost preferential trade status in 1987 because of
worker rights violations. These included Paraguay, Nicuragua, Chile and Romania.
Ray Marshall, Workers Need International Code to Protect Their Rights, L.A.
Times, July 26, 1987, § 4, at 3, col. 5.
51. The following are recognized as protected rights under 19 U.S.C. § 2462: the
right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; a prohibition on
the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employ-
ment of children; and, acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. For a further discussion
of these concepts, see discussion corresponding to notes 80-86.
52. For example, Chile which lost its GSP status on December 24, 1987, had
only about 1/8 of all its imports to the U.S. covered by the program. 5 Int'l Trade
Rap. (BNA) No. 1, at 10 (Jan. 6, 1988).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Since it is an unfair trade practice to deny intellectual
property rights while it is not to deny worker rights, we must assume that it is
more of an "unfair" trade practice to pirate a video cassette than to work children
15 hours a day in a textile factory. See Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
54. S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1974).
55. Bart S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 L. & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 569, 571 (1982).
56. P.L. 98-66 (1983); 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(8).
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eighteen criteria, the extent to which certain worker rights are
recognized in determining benefits for a particular country.5 7 This
initiative is a positive part of the United States trade policy, but
only deals with relatively few countries and products, so its world-
wide effect is limited.58 Observers, however, have noticed im-
proved labor conditions since the enactment of CBI in various
Latin American countries.5 9
A second positive step is the Overseas Private Insurance Cor-
poration (OPIC), which insures United States businesses operating
in politically risky countries. 60 As one of the requirements to re-
ceive the backing of OPIC, the country where the TNC is planning
on investing must be "taking steps to adopt and implement laws
that extend internationally recognized worker rights."61 Unfortu-
nately, the President can easily waive this "requirement."62 It is
still too early to tell what effect the OPIC standards will have,
although its free-wielding presidential discretion will probably
limit its actual effect. On the whole, both the CBI and OPIC,
while promising ideas, fail to send a strong directive to our trading
partners that labor abuses will not be tolerated.
II. A Proposal: Worker Rights Violations as an Unfair Trade Practice
From out of these positive, yet for the most part ineffective
measures being taken in United States trade policy, emerges legis-
lation with the potential of having some actual effect in the area of
international worker rights. In the last two Congressional sessions
bills have been introduced which make it an actionable unfair
trade practice for a country to gain a competitive advantage by ex-
ploiting labor.63 The first bill, H.R. 4412, introduced in 1986 was
not enacted when the Senate neglected to act on it before the end
57. P.L. 98-66 § 212(c) (1983). Subdivision 8 states that the President must con-
sider "the degree to which workers in such a country are afforded reasonable work-
place conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively ......
58. The Act only applies to 28 countries, many of which have relatively good
records on worker rights. 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (b) (1983).
59. Connecting Trade Policy to Foreign Labor Rules, Cong. Q. 852, 854 (Apr. 19,
1986). This fact provides positive support that the U.S. can, through its trade laws,
encourage the implementation of minimal labor standards.
60. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1985).
61. Id. at § 2191 (a)(1).
62. Id. at § 2191 (a)(3).
63. Both of these bills, H.R. 4412 in the 99th Congress, and H.R. 1735, which
was introduced in March 1987, are primarily the work of Rep. Donald Pease
(D.Ohio).
H.R. 4412 was introduced on March 13, 1986, as part of the House version of a
comprehensive trade bill. Cong. Index 28, 397 (1986). The bill died when the Sen-
ate failed to act on it. The bill was reintroduced as H.R. 1735 in March, 1987.
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of the session. During 1987 Congress reintroduced the bill, called
the Fair Trade and Economic Justice Act of 1987, as part of H.R. 3,
a massive trade bill.64 The House and Senate passed the trade bill,
but then sent it to conference to hammer out the differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions.65 The Administration and
certain other groups have risen in opposition to the worker rights
provision in the trade bill, raising concerns that it will not be part
of the final bill.66
A. Background of International Fair Labor Standards
Before an analysis of the bill is undertaken, it is important to
understand the background from which International Fair Labor
Standards (IFLS) have evolved, since these standards are the basis
from which the bill is derived. Furthermore, this background,
which involves standards set by numerous world organizations
over many years, lends support to the need for the recognition of
these standards in United States trade laws.67
Perhaps the first time the principle of labor standards for our
trading partners emerged was in 1890 when Congress banned im-
ports produced by convict or "slave labor." 68 While that type of
legislation may seem far removed from current proposals, the
principle involved--an intolerance for trade based on exploitation
of labor-is the same. In fact, given the severe abuses currently
taking place in some parts of the world69 the relationship between
bans on slave labor and proposals for minimum labor standards is
actually quite close.
Almost thirty years later, the Treaty of Versailles included
significant IFLS proposals. 70 A provision of the Treaty stated that
members "will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane
conditions of labour for men, women and children, both in their
own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and
64. 133 Cong. Rec. H. 1502 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987) When it went to conference
the bill contained almost 150 amendments and was 1,000 pages long. 133 Cong. Rec.
S10293 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
65. 133 Cong. Rec. S10372 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
66. The Reagan Administration was quick to oppose the worker rights provi-
sion. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 416 (Mar. 25, 1987). Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Michael R. Smith remarked that the Administration was "firmly
committed" to international worker rights, but argued that "avenues now avail-
able" would suffice. Id. at 416.
67. For a more extensive look at the history of IFLS, see 1 International Ency-
clopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, International Labor Law (1983).
68. N.Y. Times, supra note 1.
69. See discussion accompanying notes 1-15.
70. 9 The American Labor Legislation Review 302-14 (1986).
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industrial nations extend .. "71 In addition, the treaty laid the
groundwork for the International Labor Organization (ILO).72
The ILO has played a vital role in the evolution of interna-
tional fair labor standards. The ILO is a tripartite organization
with representatives of governments, employers and employees.7 3
Its goal is to improve the economic and social position of workers
and to protect their fundamental rights.74 Through the years the
standards promulgated by the ILO have been a substantial force in
furthering the cause of workers worldwide. In fact, these stan-
dards lay the goundwork for the worker rights legislation cur-
rently before Congress.
In 1948 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment attempted to establish an International Trade Organiza-
tion. In what came to be known as the Havana Charter, there was
a provision on "Fair Labour Standards," which called for the elimi-
nation of unfair labor conditions.75 Meanwhile, in the United
States, IFLS gained increased attention when President Dwight D.
Eisenhower named them as a key issue to be addressed in the up-
coming Reciprocal Trade Agreement negotiations. 76
A number of international commodity agreements also made
attempts at establishing IFLS.77 The value of these were minimal,
however, as they only applied to the single commodity that was
the subject of the agreement, such as tin or sugar. This created the
glaring inconsistency of protecting laborers in, for example, the
sugar industry, while workers in the coffee industry were open to
abuse. 78 Additionally, because they had no binding effect, they
71. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
(Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, Part I, Art. 23.
72. Treaty of Versailles, Part XIII "Labour."
73. For more complete information on the ILO, see The Impact of International
Labour Conventions and Recommendations (Geneva: ILO, 1976); Earnest A. Landy,
The Implementation Procedures of the ILO, 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 633 (1980).
74. See generally K.T. Samson, A Portrait of the ILO and its Impact on the
Lives of Workers Around the World, 9 Human Rights 32 (1980).
75. Clair Wilcox; A Charter for World Trade 233-34 (1972). Interestingly, the
International Trade Organization was never established because the U.S. refused to
ratify it. However, the ITO evolved into the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) which since 1947 has been the primary instrument guiding interna-
tional trade. Tussie, supra note 43, at 12.
76. "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," Public Papers
of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at 15 (1953). Attempts were made to im-
plement an unfair labor clause into GATT in 1953, but no agreement could be
reached as to the definition of "unfair." Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards
and International Trade, 20 J. World Trade L. 61, 64 (1986).
77. See Ulrich Kullman, Fair Labor Standards in International Commodity
Agreements, 14 J. World Trade L. 529 (1980).
78. Id. at 531-32.
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were generally ignored. 79
Recently, a minimum package of IFLS was identified by the
Netherlands National Advisory Council for Development Coopera-
tion.80 Existing International Labor Organization "Conventions"
were utilized as a minimum package for IFLS.81 These Conven-
tions, which are the standards forming the basis of the worker
rights provision in the trade bill currently under consideration by
Congress, include: the right of association,8 2 the right to organize
and bargain collectively,8 3 the abolition of forced labor,8 4 a mini-
mum age,85 and a minimum subsistence wage.86
In short, there have been scattered attempts over the past 100
years to implement international labor standards. Although these
attempts have been limited in their ability to effectuate real
change, at the very least they have created an awareness concern-
ing labor abuses. Furthermore, this historical support for basic
worker rights lays a solid foundation for the current proposal to
implement these rights into United States trade law.
B. The Proposed Legislation
The proposed legislation before Congress is a multi-faceted
worker rights initiative, which seeks to establish that certain basic
rights of workers are to be respected worldwide in the conduct of
international trade. Its objective is to prevent any country from
maintaining competitive advantage based upon the exploitation of
its workers. The bill consists of three parts which attempt to
reach this goal.
79. The agreements contained non-binding language such as "countries declare
that they will seek to..." ensure worker rights. Kullman, supra note 77, at 528.
80. Hans Tevnissen, Recommendation on Minimum International Labor Stan-
dards, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 385 (1986).
81. A "convention" is a decision reached by the ILO which is binding upon the
states which ratify it. This is distinguished from a "recommendation" which is pri-
marily perceived as a guideline. Landy, supra note 73.
82. International Labour Office, International Labour Conventions and Recom-
mendations 1919-1981 (1982). Convention No. 87, Convention Concerning Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.
For an exhaustive review of ILO conventions, see International Labor Office,
supra.
83. Id., Convention No. 98, Convention Concerning the Application of the Prin-
ciples of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively.
84. Id., Convention No. 105, Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labour.
85. Id., Convention No. 5, Convention Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission
of Children to Industrial Employment.
86. Id., Convention No. 131, Convention Concerning Minimum Wage Fixing,
with Special Reference to Developing Countries.
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1. Title I, Finding and Statement of Policy
The first part of the legislation specifies the findings and pol-
icy behind the bill.87 In stating these findings and policies, this
section refers to several agreements to which the United States is
a party that affirm various fundamental labor rights, such as the
United Nations Charter and the Revised Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States.8 8 Some of the most notable findings in-
clude: exploitation of workers is an unacceptable means for any
country or industry to gain competitive advantage in international
trade;8 9 labor repression has become an important unfair trading
practice used against the United States90 ; and exports from coun-
tries that deny internationally recognized worker rights under-
mine living and working standards in both developing countries
and the United States, because international corporations play
workers off against one another to minimize costs.9 '
The bill then states its fundamental policy objectives:
to promote the development of an open and fair international
trading system in which the benefits of trade are shared more
fully within trading countries as well as among them; to
strengthen and supplement international trading rules with a
view to renouncing the exploitation of workers by any trading
country as a means of gaining any measure of competitive ad-
vantage in international trade, and to amend United States law
so as to treat as an unfair trade practice any compeititive ad-
vantage for a country in international trade which is derived
from the denial of internationally recognized worker rights.
9 2
This first part of the bill, dealing with findings and policy, is
important for several reasons. First, it establishes the worldwide
support for worker rights as indicated by the various international
agreements that are cited.9 3 Second, this section emphasizes the
need to use fair labor standards to open up and liberalize the trad-
ing system, rather than as a means to protect domestic markets.
Third, the language contained in this policy statement is much
87. H.R. 1735, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H. 1502 (1987).
88. H.R. 1735 § 2(a) (1987). The UN Charter states in Article 55 that "the
United Nations shall promote higher standards of living, full employment, and con-
ditions of economic and social progress and development." The Revised Charter of
the Organization of American States (OAS) provides in Article 31 that "member
states agree to dedicate every effort to achieve the following basic goals[:] . . . Fair
wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable working conditions for all."
89. H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(3).
90. H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(2).
91. H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(4).
92. H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(1-3 ).
93. These agreements include the United Nations Charter, and three other UN




more firm and direct in its renunciation of exploiting workers in
order to achieve competitive advantage. This contrasts favorably
with the weak and ineffective worker rights provisions in other
statutes and agreements. 94
2. Title II-General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
Negotiating Objectives
The second section of the bill links the statutory authority of
the administration to participate in the new General Agreement
on Tariff and Trade (GATT) round of negotiations to the adoption
of a provision on worker rights.95 Before Congress will enact any
trade agreement the administration negotiates with other coun-
tries, administration officials must show that steps have been
taken to implement international labor standards into the agree-
ment. This part of the bill is important because GATT is the foun-
dation of worldwide trade relations, and in its current state it
makes no mention of fair labor standards.96
In carrying out the objectives of the second part of the bill,
three alternative approaches are allowed. The first two ap-
proaches call for GATT to declare that the exploitation of workers
is an unjustifiable means by which a country may gain competitive
advantage. The first provision would accomplish this by adding an-
other article to GATT and the second would do so by amending
existing articles. The third alternative would be the adoption and
implementation of the internationally recognized worker rights as
already defined in the United States Code.97 These approaches
would clarify conduct which is acceptable in international trade
and provide procedures to petition and confront violations.98
In order to ensure compliance, Title II requires that before
the President enters into any trade negotiations, the administra-
94. See discussion accompanying notes 56-62 and 77-78.
95. H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(5)(A-F). GATT is both an agreement which governs the
basic trade policy commitments of nearly 100 countries and an organization which
coordinates the world trading system. See Jackson & Davey, supra note 15, at 293-
312. For more information on GATT, see generally, Robert Hudec, The GATT
Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (1975).
96. GATT does prohibit trade based on "prison labour." GATT: Basic Instru-
ments and Selected Documents, Vol. IV, Art. XX (e). In essence, this provision re-
quiring the President to incorporate worker rights into GATT trade agreements is
a stronger and more detailed version of a provision in the original Trade Act of
1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(4). This provision proclaimed that "as soon as practicable"
the President take action toward the "adoption of international fair labor stan-
dards." As the language suggests, this provision has been ineffective as a means for
making worker rights a priority in GATT negotiations. See H.R. 1735 § 2(a)(7).
97. This definition is found at 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1984), supra note 51.
98. H.R. 1735 § 201.
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tion must submit a written report to Congress specifying those ac-
tions which have been taken regarding worker rights with respect
to GATT.99 Additionally, the President would be required to con-
sult with congressional committees regarding the progress being
made.100 The overall effect of Title II is to provide a means of im-
plementation for worker rights into GATT, the foundation of the
United States trade policy and the most important instrument
guiding world trade relations.
3. Title III-Relief from Unfair Trade Practices
Currently, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974101 defines de-
nial of market access, the opportunity to establish a business in a
foreign country, and the denial of intellectual property rights as
"unreasonable" and unfair trade practices. 102 Title III would
amend section 301 to include the denial of internationally-recog-
nized worker rights as an unfair trade practice. In the same way
that denial of market access by a country is considered an unfair
trade practice, the denial of fundamental worker rights by a coun-
try would also fall into that category. The bill provides several
possible sanctions for unfair trade practices including the suspen-
sion of most-favored nation status for offending countries.103
Thus, countries that are systematically repressing their workers
would potentially lose preferential trade status until significant
steps are taken towrad implementing internationally recognized
rights.
The bill provides that any "interested party" may petition the
United States Trade Representative for relief against a foreign
country that is getting a trade advantage by exploiting its workers.
So this process is not one that can only be instigated by the Ad-
ministration, but rather a cause of action for any party with requi-
site interest.104 This is a key distinction from other attempts by
99. H.R. 1735 § 202(a).
100. H.R. 1735 § 202(b).
101. P.L. 93-618 § 301 (1975); 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1984).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (e)(3).
103. H.R. 1735 § 301A (a)(2)(E). Other possible sanctions include the suspension
of the benefits of any trade agreements with that country, the assessment of duties
or the imposition of import restrictions, the negotiation of an orderly market agree-
ment or the development of administrative actions to restore the position of the in-
jured industry. Id. at § 301A (a)(2)(A-D).
104. Under H.R. 1735 § 301A(d), an "interested party" includes "a person alleg-
ing that internationally recognized worker rights defined in section 502(a)(4) have
been denied, regardless whether that person has a material interest in action being
taken under this title in response to such allegations." The complaint by an inter-
ested party putting forth "substantial evidence" of an unfair trade practice would
be investigated by the U.S. Trade Representative, who would have nine months to
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the United States to encourage international fair labor practices,
such as CBI and OPIC.105 Parties who are actually affected by the
advantage gained through the unfair labor practices, such as busi-
nesses and trade unions, have direct access to a cause of action
through section 301.
IL. Evaluating the Feasibility of H.R. 1735
The fact that current trade rules demand fair competition
with respect to other countries "dumping" their products in the
domestic market at less than fair market value, while they con-
done competition at any cost as far as workers are concerned, is
entirely inconsistent. 0 6 Furthermore, hardly an eyebrow is raised
when the government uses trade policies to effectuate political or
military ends,l0 7 but if trade is used to help reduce the plight of
the working poor in other countries various groups rise in opposi-
tion.108 In addition, the United States has long had a policy of pro-
tecting human rights throughout the world, yet the nation closes
its eyes when the abuses take place in the context of the labor
forces of our trading partners. 0 9
Despite these apparent double standards, opponents of this
make a decision. The representative would then offer a recommendation to the
President as to what action should be taken.
105. See discussion supra notes 56-62.
106. This practice is frequently referred to as the "dumping" of labor or "social
dumping" to highlight the absurd inconsistency of not allowing foreign product
prices to undercut U.S. markets while permitting foreign labor to do so. See gener-
ally Goold & Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 454.
107. A recent example is the quick calls for trade sanctions against Panama.
Within days after Panamanian strongman Manual Noriega was indicted for alleged
drug trafficking, Congress was calling for trade sanctions against Panama in an at-
tempt to force the leader to resign. Bipartisan Senate Group Introduces Bill to
Halt All Trade with Panama, Daily Rpt. Exec. (BNA) (Mar. 4, 1988).
108. Business groups such as the American Chambers of Commerce have come
out strongly against the worker rights provision of the trade reform bill (H.R. 3).
Trade Legislation Could Harm Multinations, International Chamber Representa-
tives Warn, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 802 (June 17, 1987).
At least one consumer group, concerned about rising prices, also has lobbied
against the worker rights legislation. Consumer Advocates Warn Against Adoption
of "Dangerous" Trade Bill Protectionism, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1158
(Sept. 23, 1987). In fact, there is no real evidence that prices would rise if workers'
wages in LDCs rose to a minimal standard. Even though better labor conditions
would raise labor costs somewhat, a whole new class of consumers for U.S. goods
could be created as well, thus stimulating the U.S. economy.
Even if it is conceded that prices will rise, it is a sad commentary on U.S. con-
sumers that they would rather pay a few cents less for a product, even if it is pro-
duced by children working 15 hour days.
109. Perhaps the ultimate example of how little regard is given to human rights
abuses taking place against the working poor in other countries, is that U.S. trade
laws currently protect endangered plants and animals but remain silent on imports
made by child labor. Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
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legislation have voiced several objections. Essentially, these objec-
tions have run along three lines: the bill is a form of protectionism;
it imposes United States standards on the rest of the world; and
the bill would harm the nation's economy. A close examination of
the basis of the bill and its likely effects reveals that these objec-
tions are for the most part unfounded.
A. Protectionism
Throughout the international trading community and partic-
ularly in the United States, few words elicit a more negative reac-
tion than "protectionism." It is not suprising, therefore, that
critics of this legislation have attempted to slap this label on the
bill.110 Such a position mischaracterizes the bill, which may actu-
ally, when all factors are considered, liberalize trade."'
Protectionist trade legislation is that which protects domestic
products or industries from foreign competition by providing
higher tariffs on foreign goods or limiting them in number, even if
that country has legitimately gained a competitive advantage."12
Examples of typical protectionist measures include countervailing
duties, increased tariffs, quotas, and surcharges or surtaxes. Yet
H.R. 1735 imposes no such limitations on foreign goods. It simply
encourages foreign countries which gain a competitive advantage
through an unfair practice-abuse of workers-to raise their labor
conditions to internationally recognized standards or lose preferen-
tial status. This type of system can be distinguished from a protec-
tionist one. Rather than impose higher tariffs or other restrictions
to protect a domestic industry from foreign goods which have
fairly entered our markets, the United States would merely condi-
tion preferential trade status on competition based on fair labor
110. See, e.g., A Thinly Veiled Rush for Protectionism, N.Y. Times May 31, 1987,
§ 3, at 2, col. 3; Trade Policy: Administration Opposes Worker Rights Amendment
to Omnibus Trade Legislation, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 416 (Mar. 25,
1987).
111. See infra discussion accompanying notes 100-05. In fact, one of the major
studies conducted on this issue recommended that International Fair Labor Stan-
dards be adopted in order to "facilitate trade liberalization." Report of the In-
dependent Commission on International Development Issues Under the
Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, North-South: A Program for Survival 288 (1980).
Several other studies and commentators have come to the similar conclusion
that fair labor standards would liberalize trade. See, e.g., John Mainwaring, Inter-
national Fair Labour Standards: Some Issues 21-22. (Canadian Dept. of Labor
1979); Gus Edgren, Fair Labour Standards and Trade Liberalization, 118 Int'l Lab.
Rev. 1 (1979); Philip Alston, International Trade as an Instrument of Positive
Human Rights Policy, 4 Human Rights Q. 183 (1982).




Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the bill is not
aimed at protecting particular goods or industries like protectionist
legislation. The fair labor standards apply across the board, with
the goal being improved working conditions, not protecting a par-
ticular domestic industry or product. This fact differentiates the
bill from many other "fair trade" proposals which are often
merely vehicles for protecting a politician's favored industry.114
The argument that this bill is protectionist is further dimin-
ished by the fact that in several ways this bill would substantially
decrease protectionism in United States trade policy. There are at
least two key ways in which this would be accomplished. First,
much of the public's confidence in a "free trade" system is depen-
dent on what it perceives as fairness in the world economy.11 5
Americans have difficulty supporting free trade when the goods
produced domestically are at a severe disadvantage due to unfair
practices by other countries." 6 These types of disadvantages in the
past have led to protectionist legislation aimed at warding off for-
eign products. One of the most common arguments for protection-
ism is that United States workers should not have to compete with
"sweat-shop" labor.117 Imposing international fair labor standards
113. Trade policy approaches are often categorized into three areas. One is an
open world trading system, with minimal government intervention. The second is a
protectionist philosophy, characterized by protecting import-sensitive industries.
The third is pursuit of fairness in trade, through defining and limiting unfair trade
practices. Schwab, supra note 41. The proposed legislation would fall into this
third category which finds its roots in "pragmatism and in the longstanding polit-
ical values of fairness and equity...", rather than the Keynesian notions of active
government intervention in the market place (i.e., protectionism). Id. at 161-63.
114. Phedon Nicolaides, How Fair is Fair Trade?, 21 J. World Trade L. 147, 162
(1987).
115. In a NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll conducted in 1986, Americans identified
cheap foreign labor as the overwhelming cause of America's trade deficit. The
Wages of Trade, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1977, at E16.
116. This effect is illustrated by the position of labor unions on trade policies.
Not too many years ago a majority of unions supported a liberal trade policy. Cur-
rently, the attitude is just the opposite with almost all of organized labor opposing
liberal trade. If labor were to perceive international competition as being more fair,
the likelihood of a return of support for liberal trade policies would increase. Fair
Trade and Economic Justice Act: Hearings on HR 4412 Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 99 Cong., 2d Sess. 1531 (1986) (statement of David C. Wil-
liams, Senior Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs). Secretary of Labor William
Brock also identified this phenomenon in a 1986 speech:
Those countries which are flooding world markets with goods made by
children, or by workers who can't form free trade unions or bargain
collectively, or who are denied even the most minimum standards of
safety and health are doing more harm to the principle of free and fair
trade than any protectionist groups I can think of.
Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
117. Charnovitz, supra note 76, at 74.
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would undercut such an argument for protectionism. In short, if
Americans view foreign competition as fair, rather than subsidized
by the exploitation of labor, then there is greater support for lib-
eral trade policies.118
The second way that the bill encourages liberal trade is by
providing a release for "protectionist steam." Filing an unfair
trade practice complaint under section 301 serves as a "safety
valve" in the determination of trade policy by discharging pres-
sures that exist.119 Such pressures in the past have led to extreme
protectionist measures by Congress.120 Thus, protectionist senti-
ments which may arise when a domestic industry is feeling the
strain of international competition can be mitigated by pursuing
relief under section 301. This effect of section 301 has already
been realized in other areas, where drastic protectionist measures
initiated in Congress were dropped following the filing of section
301 complaints. 121
Finally, it is important to note that labor standards which ex-
ist in our domestic economy are not viewed as restricting open
commercial competition. The United States would never allow
part of a domestic industry to gain competitive advantage over
other businesses through denial of fundamental worker rights.
Yet within a certain framework of minimal standards, businesses
are free to compete in the open market.12 2 In a similar way inter-
nationally recognized labor standards should be the framework
within which countries are free to trade and compete in world
markets. Substantial differences exist between the world economy
and individual countries, yet the examples set by the United States
and other countries in successfully implementing labor standards
while maintaining free markets is encouraging.
118. Critics of H.R. 1735 who base their objections on the notion of "free trade"
are misguided. Ever since the Boston Tea Party there has been U.S. government
intervention into the world market. Free trade is a high-sounding principle, but in
today's worldwide economy it is a fallacy. Bill Goold and John Cavanagh, A Trade
Policy For the People, The Nation, Mar. 29, 1986, at 452. See generally Harry Shutt,
The Myth of Free Trade (1985).
119. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 55.
120. Id. at 579.
121. Id. at 579-81.
122. The example of the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides strong
incentive for an international counterpart. Prior to its passage in 1938, abusive la-
bor practices such as child labor and unsafe conditions were rampant in the United
States. In addition, the economy was in shambles and there were essentially two
classes in American society, the rich and the poor, with a virtually nonexistent mid-
dle class. History has proven that the implementation of the FLSA has worked re-
markably well. To parallel the rationale that was behind the U.S. FLSA, see John




B. The Imposition of United States Standards on the
World
The second line of criticism against H.R. 1735 argues that the
United States, by imposing its labor standards on the rest of the
world, is meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. 23 Ad-
vocates of this position believe that Americans should not force
their own standards for workers on countries with different cul-
tures and values. This objection is based on a misconception of the
proposed standards. The labor standards in the bill are not based
on our Fair Labor Standards, nor were they conceived by the
United States. These standards are based on International Labor
Organization conventions, 24 which have been adopted either in
whole or part by hundreds of nations. 25 In addition to the ILO,
several other international agreements support these basic
rights. 26 They are truly internationally recognized, and, not
suprisingly, those countries which do not recognize these standards
are those which are among the worst violators of worker rights.J27
Still, critics persist in arguing that the ILO is primarily a
Western organization and does not truly reflect a world consen-
sus.128 Even if this is accepted, it still does not explain the other
international pacts which also support basic worker rights. Most
notably, the UN, with over 150 member States, including numer-
ous non-Western countries,x29 has indicated its support of these
fundamental rights in several agreements.' 3 0 When reviewing the
numerous international agreements which embody the principles
of worker rights, it becomes clear that the opposite of what critics
say is true. In a world where there is little consensus on any issue,
support for fundamental rights for workers has gained amazing in-
ternational acceptance. Additionally, foreign countries are supris-
ingly willing to discuss their internal labor policies.' 3 '
123. Shortly after the introduction of H.R. 1735, Deputy U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Michael R. Smith rejected it as "fundamentally flawed," and stated that such
an attempt to impose labor standards on the rest of the world would "reduce
trade." Supra note 66, at 416.
124. See supra notes 80-86.
125. 133 Cong. Rec. H1499 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987).
126. See discussion accompanying supra notes 88-89.
127. 133 Cong. Rec., supra note 125, at H1499.
128. Deepak Lal, Resurrection of the Pauper-Labour Argument 54-56 (1981).
129. For a list of UN member States, see Thomas Hovet, Jr. & Erica Hovet, A
Chronology and Fact Book of The United Nations 1941-1985, at 304 (1986).
130. These Agreements include the UN Charter art. 55, para. a; The UN Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights art. 23; The UN International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 8; and The UN International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 7.
131. Charnovitz, supra note 76, at 75.
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Moreover, the bill takes into account the individual differ-
ences in standards of living and economic systems that exist be-
tween countries.132 Certainly it is not expected that LDCs provide
the same minimum wage or safety standards as the United States.
The purpose behind the bill is not that workers in Bangkok are
paid the same as those in Detroit.133 Nor are safety standards
which exist for the laborer in London expected to be as stringent
in Bombay. Rather, the goal is that within a particular country's
economic and social condition, certain minimal standards which al-
low a worker to recognize his or her basic human rights are
followed.
C The Effect on the Economy
Despite the concern about protectionism and meddling in the
internal affairs of another country, perhaps the primary reasons
behind the opposition to the bill lies with concerns over profit
loss.134 United States TNCs argue that in order to compete with
foreign companies that benefit from lower labor costs, they must
also be able to take advantage of cheap labor in foreign coun-
tries.135 If not, they argue, profits will fall and prices will rise,
damaging the economy. 136 Certainly we all benefit to an extent
from United States corporations that are profitable. This does not
mean, however, that by encouraging countries to recognize mini-
mum labor standards TNCs will be unable to gain substantial ben-
efit from less expensive labor. Labor costs in LDCs would
continue to be considerably lower, but not to the point that the
worker suffers.
132. Through the discretion allowed the Trade Representative in deciding what
action to take, a country's economic and social condition will be taken into consid-
eration. H.R. 1735 § 302 (a)(4).
133. The bill does not propose a world minimum wage in the sense that, for ex-
ample, all countries must pay at least $1 per hour. But it does provide for a mini-
mum subsistence wage-enough so a person can live off what he or she makes.
Pope John Paul II has written that a "just" wage is one sufficient for "establishing
and properly maintaining a family." Quoted in Charnovitz, supra note 76, at 75. It
is beyond the scope of this article to recite a detailed economic analysis of the possi-
ble effect of international labor standards. For such an analysis, see generally Gote
Hansson, Social Causes and International Trade: An Economic Analysis of Labour
Standards in Trade Policy (1984).
134. Trade Legislation Could Harm Multinationals, supra note 108. Few would
find it surprising that the large corporations are the same group that opposed simi-
lar fair labor standards for the U.S. worker earlier this century. Cong. Q., supra
note 59, at 852.
135. Cong. Q., supra note 59, at 854. The bill applies to all importers of goods
from countries that refuse to improve labor standards, so U.S. companies will not




Competitive advantages that a country has legitimately at-
tained will continue to be attractive to TNCs. LDCs will still offer
an abundant source of lower cost labor to TNCs interested in for-
eign investment. Furthermore, other benefits would continue to
exist, including less stringent regulatory schemes and preferential
tax environments.137 In addition, LDCs frequently are able to of-
fer ample supplies of cheap natural resources and newer factories
and equipment.138 With the continuation of these benefits, LDCs
would maintain competitive advantages, but not at the expense of
the working poor, and the TNCs will continue to enjoy lower pro-
duction costs.
In addition, there is strong evidence that by improving the
economies of LDCs, the United States economy will benefit.139 By
limiting the workers wage, the TNCs and host governments are se-
verely restricting the purchasing power of a giant class of potential
consumers. LDCs buy nearly forty percent of America's exports,
which is more that Japan and the entire European Community
combined. 140 Clearly an improved economy for the LDCs means
an improved United States economy. Therefore, when substan-
dard labor practices are supported by United States dollars, there
may be some limited savings in labor costs, but there are numer-
ous detrimental effects on the nation's economy as a whole.' 4 '
As the above discussion suggests, H.R. 1735 can be an effec-
tive mechanism for improving labor conditions in many countries,
while encouraging fair liberal trade. The concerns of critics are at
best exaggerations, and at worst totally unfounded. The United
States has already proven on a smaller scale that trade based on
137. Tax incentives are utilized by many LDCs in attracting foreign business,
and they are a legitimate advantage which LDCs have over developed countries.
However, LDCs must be careful in carrying out these tax programs. See generally
Lotfi Maktouf & Stanley Surrey, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Tax and Budget-
ary Reform in Less Developed Countries, 15 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 739 (1983).
138. Jackson and Davey, supra note 15, at 629.
139. Pease and Goold, supra note 6, at 354. They cite a study which showed that
the deterioration of the economies of LDCs cost the U.S. $18.2 billion in exports
between 1980 and 1983. Futhermore, the decreasing inability of LDCs to import
products has stagnated industrialized economies' growth to the point that growth
would have been 1.3 times higher in countries such as the U.S. if the LDCs import-
ing power had not dropped between 1982 and 1983.
140. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. exports to LDCs were
valued at $72.3 billion in 1983. Cited in Pease & Goold, supra note 6, at 354.
141. There is another important, although somewhat intangible factor, which
counters the argument that connecting trade with labor standards will hurt TNCs
and the economy. Several studies, as well as common sense, tell us that the better
treated a worker is the more productive and loyal he or she becomes to the com-
pany. Thus, TNCs have a distinct interest in the conditions under which their labor
force works. See Anthony D'Amato, Are Human Rights Good for International
Business? 1 Nw. U. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 22 (1979).
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recognition of worker rights can be achieved without disrupting
trade.142 The next step should be a comprehensive implementa-
tion of fair labor standards into United States trade law.
IV. Conclusion
The crisis that exists for millions of workers throughout the
world manifests itself in different ways-child labor, subsistent
wages, hazardous work conditions-but the results are often the
same. People are unable to provide for even the basic needs of
their families, and they are unable to offer much hope to future
generations that the situation will change unless substantial steps
are taken to improve conditions. Undoubtedly, the LDCs them-
selves must share in the blame, yet the role of United States cor-
porations and trade policy should not be underestimated. As the
situation now exists, LDCs are discouraged from making any im-
provements for their workers out of fears that they will decrease
their trading competitiveness or lose foreign investment to other
countries that continue to exploit their work force. In other
words, it pays to exploit workers under the current international
trading system.
The Fair Trade and Economic Justice Act is not a panacea to
the complex and extensive problems that exist. The bill, however,
could be a clear indication that abusing the rights of workers in or-
der to attain some perceived competitive advantage will not be tol-
erated. The incentive for countries to recognize fundamental labor
standards will be strong, since they would have to do so in order to
maintain preferential trade status. Furthermore, the bill is consis-
tent with internationally accepted standards and with the United
States' trade policies which encourage liberal and fair trade. But
most importantly, the bill, by connecting trade and basic worker
rights, could play a significant role in promoting improved stan-
dards of living for people in many countries throughout the world.
142. The CBI program is one example, and its positive effects have already been
noted. See supra note 58. Additionally, worker rights have been linked successfully
to trade in bilateral agreements. Charnovitz, supra note 76, at 77. As far back as
1955 the U.S. entered into a trade agreement with Japan which called for fair labor
practices. Id. at 64. This agreement led Japan to enact its first minimum wage law.
Id. at 65.
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